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Addressing the Green Patent Global Deadlock
Through Bayh-Dole Reform
Without a global commitment to dramatically reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, climate change will very likely cause catastrophic damage in this
century. Carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems are insufficient to produce the
necessary emissions reduction; increased green technology research is also
critical.2 Intellectual property (IP) rights can provide an incentive for the
development of these technologies, but they can also impede technology
dissemination- any climate change treaty must balance this controversial
tradeoff between innovation and access.
3
During climate treaty negotiations, developing countries like China have
argued that patents limit their access to green technologies.4 Based on these
submissions, the May 2009 United Nations climate treaty negotiating text
contained proposals that wealen IP rights for green technologies.' In response,
1. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 10-12 (Lenny Bernstein et al. eds., 2oo8), available at http://www.ipcc.cb/
publications and data/publications-ipcc fourth assessment report synthesis.report.htm.
2. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 393
(2007); Paul Klemperer, What is the Top Priority on Climate Change?, Vox, Dec. 13, 2007,
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php ?q=node/8o3.
3. See STERN, supra note 2, at 420.
4. See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-Term Coop. Action Under the Convention, Bonn, F.R.G., Mar. 29-Apr. 8, 2009,
China's Views on the Fulfillment of the Bali Action Plan and the Components of the Agreed
Outcome To Be Adopted by the Conference of the Parties at Its 15 th Session, at 23, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2oo9/MISC.1 (Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2oo9/awglcaS/eng/miscol.pdf.
5. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
Term Coop. Action Under the Convention, Bonn, F.R.G., June 1-12, 2009, Negotiating Text,
187-89, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2oog/8 (May 19, 2009), available at
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the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill in June stating that "with
respect to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
[United States] should prevent any weakening of, and ensure robust
compliance with and enforcement of, existing international legal requirements
. . . for the protection of intellectual property rights related to [green
technologies].'6 Developing countries, however, continue to propose excluding
green technologies from patentability and revoking existing green patents.
7
This divide between rich and poor countries over green IP is contributing to
the delay in reaching a meaningful climate change treaty.'
This Comment argues that the United States could reduce IP-related
market inefficiencies and appease its global critics-without changing
international IP laws-by making nonpatenting or nonexclusive licenses the
default for federally funded technologies. Part I demonstrates that most basic
green energy research in the United States, including much of the research at
universities and national laboratories, is funded by the federal government.
Part II discusses problems with the current patent regime for
government-funded research. Part III offers a normative analysis of why a
socially responsible policy for government-funded green technologies ought to
favor nonpatenting and nonexclusive licenses. Finally, Part IV analyzes
possibilities for reform and suggests that even without congressional action,
agencies that distribute federal research money could nudge universities
toward responsible licensing practices by including these practices in grant
evaluation criteria.
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2oo9/awglca6/eng/o8.pdf (proposing "remov[ing] barriers
to development and transfer of technologies from developed to developing countr[ies]
arising from... intellectual property rights" or exempting least-developed countries "from
patent protection of climate-related technologies").
6. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 20o and 2011, H.R. 24io, ith Cong.
§ 112oA (2009). The amendment adding the quoted language passed 432-0. Vote on House
Amendment 187, GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd.vote=h2oo9-323
(last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
7. See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, IP Issues May Go to 'Higher Political Level' in Copenhagen amid
Difficulties, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/12/
09/ip-issues-may-go-to-'higher-political-level'-in-copenhagen-amid-difficuties/ (noting
that the G77 countries have stood together in asking for green patent exemptions).
8. See Tessa J. Schwartz & Sarah Tierney Niyogi, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property
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I. THE CRITICAL ROLE OF FEDERAL FUNDING IN BASIC GREEN
TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH
Government funding will lead to new green technologies to combat climate
change. In 2006, sixty percent of basic research in the United States was
funded by the federal government, twenty-one percent was funded directly by
universities and other nonprofits, and only fifteen percent was funded by
industry.9 The relative importance of government-funded basic research will
increase with rising funding levels. The 2009 stimulus package provided
$2 billion for basic science research within the Department of Energy (DOE)
and $3 billion for the National Science Foundation (NSF), 1" a significant
addition to their respective 2009 budgets of $4.77 billion and $5.18 billion."
President Obama noted that the Act "represents the biggest increase in basic
research funding" in American history, commenting that "we are taking big
steps down the road to energy independence, laying the groundwork for new
green energy economies."
Researchers are using this federal funding for basic research projects that
might lead to game-changing green technologies,13 but IP policy could limit the
9. See MARK BOROUSH, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., NATIONAL PATTERNS OF R&D RESOURCES: 2007
DATA UPDATE 28 tbl.6 (20o8), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsfo8318/pdf/
nsfo8318.pdf. The federal government also funds applied research, and the proposals in this
Comment apply to all federally funded research, but unnecessary patenting poses particular
problems for basic research. See infra note 19.
1o. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 131,
139-40.
ii. Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Star. 524, 590, 618 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
12. Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President and the Vice President at Signing of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/emarks-by-the-President-and-Vice-President-at-Signing-of-the
-American-Recovery-an/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2009); see also Eli Kintisch, DOE Gives $151
Million to 'Out-of-Box' Research, 326 SCIENCE 651, 651 (2009) ("Three days after President
Barack Obama (said] ... that he would lead the country into a 'new frontier' of clean energy
research, a fledgling federal agency .... gave grants to 37 teams at companies, universities,
and national labs .... ").
13. See, e.g., Nathaniel M. Gabor et al., Extremely Efficient Multiple Electron-Hole Pair Generation
in Carbon Nanotube Photodiodes, 325 SCIENCE 1367, 1368 (2009) (noting that their research
results might "improve the efficiency of photovoltaic solar cells beyond standard
thermodynamic limits"); Matthew W. Kanan & Daniel G. Nocera, In Situ Formation of an
Oxygen-Evolving Catalyst in Neutral Water Containing Phosphate and CO2", 321 SCIENCE 1072,
1072 (2008) (noting that "[s]unlight is the only renewable and carbon-neutral energy source
of sufficient scale to replace fossil fuels" and reporting the discovery of a catalyst that can use
solar energy to convert water into hydrogen and oxygen for energy storage).
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dissemination of these inventions. In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act clarified that
recipients of federal research grants can patent these new technologies "to
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported
research," 4 and universities and other federally funded entities have begun
patenting many of their researchers' discoveries.'" Many new green
technologies will thus be protected by public-sector patents, 6 which can
hinder public access to these results, both in the United States and worldwide.
II. PUBLIC SECTOR PATENTS AS IMPEDIMENTS TO GREEN
TECHNOLOGIES
The Bayh-Dole Act has been highly controversial over its nearly thirty-year
history. Proponents argue that it has led to economic growth, particularly in
the biotechnology industry. 7 Critics counter that Bayh-Dole has negatively
affected the practice and norms of science, 8 created "anticommons" problems
and contributed to patent hold-ups, 9 and led to unnecessary increases in
consumer prices.2"
14. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
is. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 611, 614 (2008). This surge in patenting is being accomplished by the universities, not
by individual researchers, who generally must assign away their patent rights. Id. at 621.
16. For example, as of November 24, 2009, MIT had over thirty green energy technologies
available for licensing in fields including batteries, biofuels, carbon capture, energy
efficiency, fuel cells, and photovoltaics. MIT Technology Licensing Office, Selection of
Energy and Material Technologies Available for Licensing, http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/
EMletteri/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
17. See Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 151, 155-57 (2006).
18. See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 109 (1999).
19. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 28o SCIENCE 698 (1998); Lemley, supra note 15, at
615-19; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress ofBiomedicine,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289, 295-303 ; Anthony D. So et al., Is
Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLoS BIOLOGY
2078, 2o8o (20o8). These are both problems of transaction costs: an anticommons occurs
when too many IP rights in basic research create obstacles for future research, and hold-ups
occur when a patent holder impedes a product's development by demanding royalties.
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Patents are not needed to motivate university researchers to innovate;
instead, the justification for Bayh-Dole patents is that they provide the
incentive to commercialize.2  Under this commercialization theory,
corporations need exclusive rights to attract the capital required to turn
university inventions into commercial products. As Mark Lemley has noted,
however, "the validity of commercialization theory depends a great deal on the
industry in question."2 Patents are certainly not always a prerequisite for
commercialization, as many technologies arising from federal research funding
were commercialized without patents prior to Bayh-Dole 3 Exclusive patent
rights might be needed in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries,
given the high cost of gaining FDA approval for a new drug and the low cost of
imitation. In engineering fields like green energy, however, although
significant capital may be necessary to bring new technologies to market,
4
patents are typically unnecessary for commercialization due to a lower ratio of
regulatory barriers to imitation costs,"5 the cumulative nature of innovation,6
and other methods of obtaining competitive advantage.
2 7
21. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 621; Rai, supra note 18, at 97-99. Patent incentives are
important for spurring private-sector innovation, but university scientists were innovating
long before the Bayh-Dole Act, primarily out of desire for prestige (and the resulting tenure
and prizes), and they receive comparatively little financial gain from the patents. See Lemley,
supra note 15, at 621; Rai, supra note 18, at 92; Jason R. Wiener, Sharing Potential and the
Potential for Sharing: Open Source Licensing as a Legal and Economic Modality for the
Dissemination of Renewable Energy Technology, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 294 (2006).
22. Lemley, supra note 15, at 622.
23. See id. at 624; So et al., supra note 19, at 2079.
24. See Wiener, supra note 21, at 294. Wiener does not conclude that these costs require more
exclusive patent rights; rather, he argues that governments should encourage "open source"
licensing of green energy technologies. Id. at 294-302.
25. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1589 &
n.37 (2003) (describing evidence that patents are only important in a few industries like
pharmaceuticals); id. at 1615-30 (arguing that commercialization theory-also known as
prospect theory-is appropriate for pharmaceuticals because of their high regulatory
barriers and relatively low imitation cost, but not for other technologies).
26. See Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2169, 2195-96 & nn.134-37
(2009) (noting that the comparative value of each individual patent is lower in engineering
fields than in pharmaceuticals because of the large number of innovations involved in each
product, and describing empirical findings that patents are not important for technology
transfer in engineering fields).
27. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 25, at 1584-85 (describing why the "first-mover advantage"
and trade secret protection often have more practical importance than patents); Lemley,
supra note 15, at 624 (arguing that there is no reason to think patents are needed for
commercialization outside the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries).
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Indeed, even pro-IP reports present no evidence that green patents are
necessary for commercialization or for public-sector innovation. A European
study argued that green patents provide needed private-sector innovation
incentives and that "[patented] technologies are not necessarily more
expensive," but it did not argue that patents help commercialization (as
opposed to innovation).28 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's congressional
testimony on IP and global warming similarly focused on the private-sector
innovation justification for green patents.2 9 Commercialization theory thus
fails to justify exclusive patent rights on most government-funded green
technologies.
There is concern, however, that patents actually hinder the spread of these
new technologies. Benjamin Sovacool's interviews with energy experts
indicated that patents can "prevent, complicate, or delay commercialization"
for a wide range of reasons, including anticommons problems.30 The
Eco-Patent Commons -a pool of free green patents contributed by companies
like IBM, DuPont, and Sony- demonstrates that some companies believe that
putting green patents in the public domain can help disseminate these
technologies." Most significantly, as noted above, developing countries express
great concern about intellectual property barriers impeding their access to
green technologies, and these concerns have threatened to derail climate treaty
negotiations.32 In summary, patenting federally funded green technologies
under the Bayh-Dole Act is not necessary for either innovation or
commercialization. On the contrary, there is evidence that patents limit access
to these technologies, both in the United States and around the world. Part III
a8. COPENHAGEN ECON. A/S & THE IPR Co. APS, ARE IPR A BARRIER TO THE TRANSFER OF
CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY? 4 (2009), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2oo9/february/tradoc_142371.pdf.
29. Climate for Innovation: Technology and Intellectual Property in Global Climate Solutions:
Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warming, ilith Cong.
3-4 (2oo9) (statement of Mark T. Esper, Executive Vice President, Global Intellectual
Property Center, U.S. Chamber of Commerce), available at
http://globalwarming.house.gov/files/HRG/o729o9IP/Esper.pdf.
30. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights
May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
381, 385, 399, 422, 439 (2008); cf. Daniel R. Cahoy & Leland Glenna, Private Ordering and
Public Energy Innovation Policy, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 433-35 (2009) (noting that the
biofuel patent landscape seems ripe to become a patent thicket, but arguing that "private
forces" will "reshape ownership trends and realign innovation").
31. See Mary Tripsas, Everybody in the Pool of Green Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at
BU 5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oog/1i/oi/business/olproto.html.
32. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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discusses how to bring patenting and licensing practices under the Bayh-Dole
Act more in line with its public-spirited goals.
III.SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE LICENSING FOR GREEN ENERGY
RESEARCH
The first-listed goal of the Bayh-Dole Act- "the utilization of inventions
arising from federally supported research" -would be served best if
universities and other federally funded research entities only sought exclusive
patent licenses when required for commercialization. Unfortunately, the
interests of university technology transfer offices are not aligned with this goal.
Instead, "university technology transfer activities continue to be predominantly
patent-centric and revenue-driven with a single-minded focus on generating
licensing income and obtaining reimbursement for legal expenses. '
This disconnect between the ideals of the Bayh-Dole Act and its real-world
application has been recognized in the field of biomedical research. Scholars
and advocates have pushed agencies and universities to adopt more socially
responsible licensing practices." National Institutes of Health (NIH)
guidelines state that biomedical research tools and genomic inventions should
be patented and exclusively licensed only when required for
33. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006) (emphasis added). Other goals, which also counsel against exclusive
licenses, include "promot[ing] free competition and enterprise without unduly
encumbering future research" and "promot[ing] the commercialization and public
availability of inventions made in the United States." Id. (emphasis added). I use "socially
responsible licensing" to refer to practices that meet these goals of increasing the use and
availability of federally funded technologies, as opposed to increasing the profit of the
patentee.
34. Kesan, supra note 26, at 2169. Note that it is the university technology transfer offices that
are revenue driven, not the individual researchers, and that university administrators have
very little control over how much federal money professors receive or how they spend it.
Further, few universities actually succeed in their goal of raising significant revenue through
their patents, with most universities failing to generate even enough licensing revenue to
offset the cost of running a technology transfer office. Id. at 218o & n.64. Changing the
licensing practices would therefore have minimal effect on innovation.
3s. See Amy Kapczynski et aL, Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for
University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005); Beirne Roose-Snyder & Megan
K. Doyle, The Global Health Licensing Program: A New Model for Humanitarian Licensing at
the University Level, 35 Am. J.L. & MED. 281 (2009). I use "socially responsible" to refer to
licensing practices that focus on the public interest, not the private gain of the licensor.
Whether universities should maximize the U.S. public interest or the global public interest
need not be resolved here, as the practices recommended in this Comment would benefit
both.
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commercialization. 6 Although the NIH's guidance was initially criticized by
members of the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) ,
7
AUTM and many universities later endorsed a more general principle that
universities "should strive to grant just those rights necessary to encourage
development of the technology.",8
AUTM has also recently endorsed "strategies that promote the availability
of health-related technologies in developing countries for essential medical
care."39 Under this market-segmentation strategy, pharmaceutical companies
can use patent protection in high-income countries to recoup their
development costs, while generic competition drives down the prices of
medicines in low- and middle-income countries.
4 °
While these proposals focus on pharmaceuticals, the argument for
promoting access by weakening university IP protections is even stronger in
other industries where patent incentives are less important.4 Socially
responsible licensing policies for green technologies should make nonpatenting
or nonexclusive licenses the default, unless there are exceptional circumstances
under which an exclusive patent license is necessary for commercialization.
42
Additionally, even when exceptional circumstances warrant an exclusive
36. Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,413 (Apr. 11, 2005);
Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090 (Dec.
23, 1999).
37. See David Malakoff, NIH Roils Academe with Advice on Licensing DNA Patents, 303 SCIENCE
1757 (2004).
38. CAL. INST. OF TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS To CONSIDER IN
LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 2 (2007), http://www.autm.net/Nine-Pointsto
_Consider.htm.
39. ASS'N OF UNIv. TECH. MANAGERS ET AL., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES FOR
THE EQUITABLE DISSEMINATION OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 1-2 (2009),
http://www.autm.netConten/NavigationMenu/TechTransfer/GlobalHealth/
Statementofprincliples.pdf (sic] (footnote omitted).
40. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 35, at lo88-89; Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 35, at
285-98.
41. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
42. This would reverse the current burden, where "exceptional circumstances" are needed to
declare an area off-limits to patenting. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. S 202(a)(ii) (20o6). Also
note that while socially responsible licensing practices are particularly important for green
technologies, the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act would be served best if all federally funded
research were patented and licensed in a way to expand public access to this research.
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license, these policies should eliminate IP-related barriers to access in
developing countries.
43
IV.TYING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE LICENSING PRACTICES TO
FEDERAL RESEARCH GRANTS
Mandating that federally funded green technologies be available in
developing countries could help narrow the policy differences that obstruct a
global climate change treaty. A congressional amendment to the Bayh-Dole Act
would be a straightforward reform and would send a clear international signal.
Congress could add a goal of global dissemination of federally funded research
for humanitarian needs, and could give agencies the discretion necessary to
create technology transfer policies consistent with these goals." In the absence
of congressional action, however, there is room for change within the current
Bayh-Dole regime to make university practices more consistent with the
purposes of the Act.
A number of scholars and advocates have pushed for changes to licensing
practices at the university level, particularly as part of the access to medicines
movement. 4s While these efforts have resulted in some success,46 universities'
financial interests are aligned against these changes, 47 and universities also face
a significant collective action problem. 4s When these difficulties are combined
with the collective action problem that faces climate change itself,49 it seems
43. "Developing countries" should be defined in a way that includes middle-income countries
like China and India that are concerned about U.S. patents and that have the manufacturing
capacity to produce low-cost, off-patent green technologies for use in low-income countries.
The World Bank provides classifications based on per capita gross national income. World
Bank, Data & Statistics: Country Classification, http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CCo
(last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
44. Cf Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 310 (arguing that Bayh-Dole should be amended to
give agencies more discretion in declaring areas off limits to patenting). Many scholars have
also suggested amending Bayh-Dole to provide an "academic research exemption," see, e.g.,
Sovacool, supra note 30, at 434, but this would have limited effect and would not address the
real problems with university patents. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Access to
Bio-Knowledge: From Gene Patents to Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. N1,
28-41, http://sdr.stanford.edu/pdf/ouellette-access-to-bio-knowledge.pdf.
45. See, e.g., Kapczynski et al., supra note 35, at 1078-9o; Lemley, supra note 15, at 625-28.
46. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
47. See Kesan, supra note 26, at 2169.
48. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 305-06.
49. See STERN, supra note 2, at 51o (describing the international collective action problem).
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unlikely that universities will independently adopt socially responsible
licensing policies for green technologies.
Federal agencies that provide funding for green energy research, such as the
NSF and DOE, can initiate more immediate change. Nonmandatory licensing
guidelines for green technologies, like the NIH guidelines for biomedical
research, 0 may have hortatory value in shaping university licensing norms."' In
order to actually limit a grant recipient's patent rights, however, agencies must
find "exceptional circumstances" such that the limitation "will better promote
the policy and objectives" of the Bayh-Dole Act. 2 Even though such
intervention may be warranted, the "elaborate administrative procedure for
challenging such determinations" has caused these declarations to be
"extremely rare." 3 The Bayh-Dole Act also allows agencies to exercise
"march-in rights" after a patent is granted, but this procedure has proved
equally toothless.5 4
Previous analyses of the role of agencies in Bayh-Dole reform have focused
on this ability to set broad guidelines and influence patenting decisions for
technologies that are already developed,"5 but agencies could have more success
through their ex ante control over which research projects get funded. If
funding decisions depended in part on how the resulting technology would be
licensed, university researchers would be more invested in ensuring that their
institutions had socially responsible licensing policies. Criteria for grant
selection vary by agency, 6 but a change by just one agency could lead to new
university policies that affect many licensing decisions.
The NSF has at least two options for influencing technology transfer
policies within its broad mandate to award grants "on the basis of merit."5T
5o. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The agencies could also consider Department of
Commerce regulations for government-owned inventions, which only allow exclusive
licenses if "[t]he public will be served by the granting of the license" and "[t]he proposed
scope of exclusivity is not greater than reasonably necessary to provide the incentive for
bringing the invention to practical application." 37 C.F.R. § 404.7(a)(1)(ii) (2008).
51. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 306-08.
52. 35 U.S.C. S 202(a)(ii) (2006).
S3. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 293-94.
s4. Id. at 294.
ss. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 628; Rai, supra note 18, at 147-48; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note
19, at 303-10; So et al., supra note 19, at 2080.
56. The rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act do not apply to matters
related to grants, 5 U.S.C. S 553(a)(2) (2oo6), but there are requirements in the agencies'
substantive statutes.
57. 4 2U.S.C. § 1862c(a)(2)(A).
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First, the NSF could require institutions receiving grants to have socially
responsible licensing policies. 8 The NSF could only recommend policy
content, but forcing universities to publicly address these issues would likely
bring their practices more in line with the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act. Second,
the NSF could include licensing considerations in individual project reviews.
NSF proposals are peer reviewed not only for "intellectual merit," but also for
"broader impacts," including whether the results will be disseminated broadly
and how the results will benefit society. 9 The NSF could simply add examples
related to licensing -such as a statement that the researcher's university had
adopted a socially responsible licensing policy-to its current examples of how
to satisfy the broader impacts criterion.6" This option would bring licensing
concerns to the attention of the scientists, rather than just to the university
administrators who prepare the bulk of grant applications, and it is easier to
implement within the current review process.
Similarly, the DOE could influence university licensing practices by
imposing a blanket requirement that institutions receiving grants have socially
responsible licensing policies, or it could exercise more subtle influence by
including a researcher's plans for commercialization in the merit-based review
process. Licensing considerations could enter the definition of "merit," the
"[olther appropriate factors" set forth in the grant announcement, or the
"other available advice or information as well as program policy factors" that
are considered during basic research proposal reviews."
CONCLUSION
The U.S. government is investing in basic green energy research to address
global climate change, but the current practices for patenting and licensing
these new technologies will likely impede their dissemination, both within the
United States and throughout the world. The refusal of the United States to
58. The NSF already requires institutions to have conflict-of-interest policies. NAT'L SCI.
FOUND., PROPOSAL AND AwARD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GUIDE pt. II, at LV-i
(2009), available at http://www.nsf.gov/publications/pub-sunm.jsp?ods-key=nsfiol. This
requirement became effective in 1995 after a notice-and-comment period. 59 Fed. Reg.
33,308 (June 28, 1994).
59. NAT'L Sci. FOUND., supra note 58, pt. I, at HI-i.
60. NAT'L Sci. FOUND., MERIT REvIEw BROADER IMPACTS CRITERION: REPRESENTATIVE
AcTIvTEs (2007), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/gpg/broaderimpacts.pdf. The NSF
has little power to enforce promises made in grant applications, but the threat of future
grants being rejected should compel researchers to follow through on their commitments.
61. lo C.F.R_ § 605.i0 (2009).
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negotiate over IP thus harms its own economic interests in addition to
contributing to the climate change treaty deadlock. By changing licensing
practices for these inventions, the United States could help satisfy its global
critics while still maintaining strong IP laws to encourage private-sector
innovation.
LISA LARRIMORE OUELLETTE
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